Redistribution and Tax Evasion: an Asymmetric Information Approach by Platoni, Silvia (ORCID:0000-0002-4637-0723) & Timpano, Francesco (ORCID:0000-0002-3445-6300)
QUADERNI DEL DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE 
ECONOMICHE E SOCIALI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE 
PIACENZA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REDISTRIBUTION AND TAX EVASION:  
AN ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION APPROACH  
 
 
Silvia Platoni, Francesco Timpano 
 
 
 
Serie Rossa: Economia – Quaderno N. 94  luglio 2013 
 
Redistribution and Tax Evasion:
an Asymmetric Information Approach
Silvia Platoni∗, Francesco Timpano
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche e sociali, Universita` Cattolica
del Sacro Cuore, via Emilia Parmense 84, 29122, Piacenza, Italy
Abstract
The article studies the optimal redistribution system, achieved by direct tax-
ation, indirect taxation and public provision of the pseudo-necessary good,
when individuals, who differ in productivity, can take hidden actions (tax eva-
sion by moral hazard) and have hidden information (tax evasion by adverse
selection). It proves that any Government willing to effectively reallocate
resources among individuals has to undertake measures against tax evasion,
i.e. to establish tax evasion fines.
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1. Introduction
Atkinson (1977) argues that the choice between direct and indirect taxes is
one of the crucial issues of taxation policy due to the challenging theoretical
questions arising and its significant policy relevance (see, among others, Cre-
mer et al., 2001). Since taxation is a key instrument to redistribute among
individuals, assessing the re-distributional power of differential commodity
taxation versus nonlinear income taxation is of great interest in the literature
on optimal taxation (Saez, 2002).
The role of differential commodity taxation has been seriously under-
mined by the seminal paper of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976); they study the
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optimal direct and indirect tax mix problem in presence of individuals dif-
fering for the sole earning ability and show that nonlinear income taxation
does not need to be supplemented by commodity taxation when preferences
are weakly separable in labour supply and produced goods.
As Boadway and Pestieau (2002) have pointed out, a number of stud-
ies have tried to further investigate the “Atkinson-Stiglitz” theorem. In a
framework of strong homogeneity of preferences for consumption goods, while
Mirrlees (1976) shows that commodity taxation is desirable on goods that
are relatively more preferred by the high skilled individuals, Christiansen
(1984) proves that goods that are complementary with leisure should be
taxed. Boadway and Pestieau (2002) consider how robust the “Atkinson-
Stiglitz” theorem is with respect to differences in needs or endowments of
goods, more than one type of labour supply, differences in preference for
leisure, and restrictions on policy instruments; they conclude that in devel-
oping countries the compliance and administration costs of income taxation
are so high that tax authorities have to rely on indirect taxation.
The recent literature focuses on the role of indirect taxes when individuals
are heterogeneous in one or more characteristics. Cremer et al. (2001) assume
individuals differ in several unobservable characteristics (i.e. productivity
and endowment) and prove that differential commodity taxation is a useful
instrument of tax policy even if preferences are separable between labour
and produced goods. Saez (2002) assumes individuals are heterogeneous
in earnings and tastes and shows that a small tax on a given commodity
is desirable if high income earners have a relatively higher taste for this
commodity or if consumption of this commodity increases with leisure.
There is also a large literature on the economics of tax evasion: while
some authors are interested in tax evasion on the indirect taxes (see, among
others, Cremer and Gahavari, 1993), others are interested in tax evasion on
the direct taxes (see, among others, Cremer and Gahavari, 1996).
Most of these articles follow the standard approach originated in Alling-
ham and Sandmo (1972) and treat the decision of how much tax to evade as
one of choosing a consumption stream under uncertainty: taxpayers, faced
with a given probability of penalty, will choose the amount of evasion which
maximizes their expected utilities (see Boadway and Sato, 2000).
This article investigates the tax evasion problem from an innovative per-
spective, which is relying on the analytical categories proper of the asymmet-
ric information setting: individuals can take hidden actions to affect their
labour supply and commodity demands (tax evasion by moral hazard) and
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hide information about their productivity (tax evasion by adverse selection).
If individuals only take hidden actions, the Government can implement
the redistribution system without auditing them but imposing the incentive
constraints; on the contrary, if individuals also hide information, to imple-
ment the redistribution system the Government has to audit and to punish
them.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the
setup of the model, Section 3 considers a public information environment
without and with the redistribution system, in Section 4 the individuals can
take hidden actions and in Section 5 the individuals can take hidden actions
and also have hidden information. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
In the economy there are two commodities i = 1, 2 (the pseudo-necessity and
the pseudo-luxury) and two individual types h = A,B (the more efficient or
high income workers and the less efficient or low income workers).
The population n is partitioned into the two groups A,B with n = nA +
nB. Assuming the population size is large, the probabilities pih = piA, piB,
with piA + piB = 1, are also the population share between the two individual
types.
Both the individual types A,B are constrained by the same time endow-
ment T and the same unearned lump-sum income I = 01. With Lh labour
and `h leisure, the time endowment is Lh+`h = T , and hence the full income
yh of the individual type h = A,B is:
yh =
(
wh − τh) · T = mh · T, h = A,B (1)
(see De Bartolome, 1990; Kaiser, 1993), where wh is the gross wage rate, τh
the labour income tax and mh the net wage rate. The consumer price qi for
the good i = 1, 2 is:
qi = pi + ti, i = 1, 2, (2)
where pi is the producer price and ti the commodity tax.
1The assumption of constant returns to scale, together with competitive behaviour,
implies that the firms earn zero profits. Therefore, the households receive no profit income
and the lump-sum income is zero (Myles, 1995).
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The redistribution systems will be illustrated presenting a computational
model where the parametrisation is chosen mainly for numerical convenience
and considering a Klein-Rubin (Klein and Rubin, 1948) or Stone-Geary
(Stone, 1954; Geary, 1950) utility function (KR-SG) and Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction functions (CD)2.
3. Public Information
The household’s problem (Utility Maximization Problem - UMP) is:
Uh = max
xh,`h
U
(
xh, `h
)
s.t.
∑
i=1,2
pi · xhi + wh · `h ≤ wh · T
(
λh
)
,
(3)
with xh = (xh1 , x
h
2) (see, among others, Deaton and Muellbauer, 1981; Kaiser,
1993). The FOCs of the UMP (3) entail:
pi =
1
λh
· ∂Uh
∂xhi
wh = 1
λh
· ∂Uh
∂`h
.
(4)
Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution is:
MRS1,2 =
p1
p2
=
∂Uh
xh1
∂Uh
xh2
, (5)
and with λh = ∂U
h
∂`h
· 1
wh
it is also possible to write:
∂Uh
∂xhi
=
∂Uh
∂`h
· pi
wh
. (6)
The demand of good i by individual h is xhi = xi(p, w
h) and the leisure
demand by individual h is `h = `(p, wh), with p = (p1, p2). The properties
of the Walrasian demand functions are analysed in Appendix A.
2The parameter values are piA = piB = 0.5 and T = 100, A1 = 1.1, A2 = 1 and
αA1 = 0.55, α
A
2 = 0.6 (and then α
B
1 = 0.45, α
B
2 = 0.4), α = 0.33, β = 0.33, γ = 0.33 and
b1 = 13, b2 = −13, b` = 0.
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The dual problem (Expenditure Minimization Problem - EMP) is:
eh = min
xh,`h
∑
i=1,2
pi · xhi + wh · `h
s.t. U
(
xh, `h
) ≥ U (νh) . (7)
The FOCs of the EMP (7) entail:
pi = ν
h · ∂Uh
∂xhi
wh = νh · ∂Uh
∂`h
,
(8)
and therefore with 1
νh
= ∂U
h
∂`h
· 1
wh
it is possible to obtain equation (6).
The set of optimal commodities and leisure quantities in the EMP (7)
are denoted by hi(p, w
h, U) for i = 1, 2 and by hL(p, w
h, U).
Considering the Walrasian demand functions xi(p, w
h, I) and `(p, wh, I)
allows to relate the Hicksian and Walrasian demands as in (C.1). Since I = 0,
the equations in (B.6) and in (C.2) can be rewritten as:
∂xi(p,wh)
∂pj
=
∂hi(p,wh,U)
∂pj
= Shij and
∂L(p,wh)
∂pj
=
∂hL(p,wh,U)
∂pj
= ShLj,
∂xi(p,wh)
∂wh
=
∂hi(p,wh,U)
∂wh
= IhiL and
∂L(p,wh)
∂wh
=
∂hL(p,wh,U)
∂wh
= IhLL,
(9)
with i, j = 1, 2, where Shij and S
h
Lj are the substitution effects and I
h
iL and
IhLL are the pseudo-income effects.
Multiplying the first equation in (9) by
pj
xhi
, the second equation by
pj
Lh
,
the third equation by w
h
xhi
and the fourth equation by w
h
Lh
allows to obtain the
direct and cross elasticities:
εhij = S
h
ij · pjxj and εhLj = ShLj ·
pj
Lh
,
εhiL = I
h
iL · w
h
xhi
and εhLL = I
h
LL · w
h
Lh
(10)
with i, j = 1, 2. If the good i = 1 is a pseudo-necessity, then the pseudo-
income elasticity is between 0 and 1, that is 0 ≤ εh1L < 1 ⇒ 0 ≤ ∂x
h
1
∂wh
· wh
xh1
<
1⇒ ∂xh1
∂wh
<
xh1
wh
(the good 1 is substitute to leisure and his demand is inelastic
to wage rate) and if the good i = 2 is a pseudo-luxury then the pseudo-income
elasticity is greater than 1, that is εh2L ≥ 1⇒ ∂x
h
2
∂wh
· wh
xh2
≥ 1⇒ ∂xh2
∂wh
≥ xh2
wh
(the
good 2 is substitute to leisure and his demand is elastic to wage rate).
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Considering a log transformation of the KR-SG utility function, the
household choices are determined by the UMP :
Uh = max
xh,Lh
α · ln (xh1 − b1)+ β · ln (xh2 − b2)+
+γ · ln ((T − Lh)− b`)
s.t.
∑
i=1,2
pi · xhi − wh · Lh ≤ 0
(
λh
)
,
(11)
with α + β + γ = 1 and b1 > 0 (the good 1 ia a pseudo-necessity), b2 < 0
(the good 2 ia a pseudo-luxury), and b` = 0; the demand system of individual
h = A,B for the goods i = 1, 2 and leisure ` is:
xh1 = b1 + α ·
wh·(T−b`)
∑
i=1,2
pi·bi
p1
,
xh2 = b2 + β ·
wh·(T−b`)
∑
i=1,2
pi·bi
p2
,
T − Lh = b` + γ ·
wh·(T−b`)
∑
i=1,2
pi·bi
wh
.
(12)
whose elasticities εh1j, ε
h
2j and ε
h
Lj (with j = 1, 2, L) in (10) are provided in
Appendix D (see equations in (D.1), (D.2) and (D.3)).
Considering the production side of the economy and assuming the pro-
duction function is f(Li; n), where Li = (L
A
i , L
B
i ) and n = (n
A, nB), the
Profit Maximization Problem (PMP) of the good i = 1, 2 is:
Πi = max
Li
pi · f (Li; n)−
∑
h=A,B
wh · nh · Lhi . (13)
Therefore, the marginal rate of transformation is:
MRT1,2 =
p1
p2
=
∂f2
∂Lh2
∂f1
∂Lh1
, h = A,B (14)
and the marginal rate of technical substitution is:
MRTSA,B =
wA
wB
=
∂fi
∂LAi
∂fi
∂LBi
, i = 1, 2. (15)
Assuming ∂f1
∂Lh1
> ∂f2
∂Lh2
yields to p1 < p2 and assuming
∂fi
∂LAi
> ∂fi
∂LBi
yields to
wA > wB.
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The clearing conditions are ensured since prices p1 and p2 guarantee the
goods markets are in equilibrium:
p1 : f (L1; n) = n
A · xA1 + nB · xB1 ,
p2 : f (L2; n) = n
A · xA2 + nB · xB2 ; (16)
and wage rates wA and wB guarantee the labour market is in equilibrium:
wA : LA1 + L
A
2 = L
A,
wB : LB1 + L
B
2 = L
B.
(17)
A CD production function f(Li;Ai,αi,n) is adopted for both commodi-
ties i = 1, 2, where αi = (α
A
i , α
B
i ). Therefore, the PMP of the good i = 1, 2
is:
Πi = max
Li
pi ·
(
Ai ·
(
nA · LAi
)αAi · (nB · LBi )αBi )− ∑
h=A,B
wh · nh · Lhi , (18)
and the production functions in (18) are characterized by A1 > A2, which
signifies the assumption that the rate of labour-augmenting technological
progress Ai is higher in the production of good 1 than in the production of
good 23, and by constant returns to scale αAi + α
B
i = 1.
Moreover, it is assumed that the production functions in (18) are charac-
terized not only by αAi > α
B
i (type A individuals are more efficient than type
B individuals), but also by αA2 > α
A
1 (type A individuals are more efficient in
the production of good 2, that is the production of good 2 is A-labour inten-
sive with respect to the production of good 1) and then, with αBi = 1− αAi ,
by αB1 > α
B
2 (type B individuals are more efficient in the production of good
1, that is the production of good 1 is B-labour intensive with respect to the
production of good 2).
Therefore, the marginal rate of transformation is:
MRT1,2 =
p1
p2
=
A2 · αA2 ·
(
nB ·LB2
nA·LA2
)αB2
A1 · αA1 ·
(
nB ·LB1
nA·LA1
)αB1 = A2 · α
B
2 ·
(
nA·LA2
nB ·LB2
)αA2
A1 · αB1 ·
(
nA·LA1
nB ·LB1
)αA1 , (19)
3In other words, the production of commodity 1 benefits more from technological
progress and/or is more capital intensive than the production of commodity 2. In fact,
luxuries are often produced in small batches, using labour intensive methods, in contrast
to necessities, which tend to be produced on a larger scale, using capital intensive methods
(Burkett, 2006).
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and the marginal rate of technical substitution is:
MRTSA,B =
wA
wB
=
A1 · αA1 ·
(
nB ·LB1
nA·LA1
)αB1
A1 · αB1 ·
(
nA·LA1
nB ·LB1
)αA1 = A2 · α
A
2 ·
(
nB ·LB2
nA·LA2
)αB2
A2 · αB2 ·
(
nA·LA2
nB ·LB2
)αA2 . (20)
Assuming A1 > A2 entails
∂f(L1;A1,α1,n)
∂Lh1
> ∂f(L2;A1,α2,n)
∂Lh2
and then p1 < p2 and
assuming αAi > α
B
i entails
∂f(Li;Ai,αi,n)
∂LAi
> ∂f(Li;Ai,αi,n)
∂LBi
and then wA > wB.
The results of the simulation in case of public information are presented in
table 1, which displays (i) quantities and utilities, (ii) prices and expenditures
and (iii) elasticities.
Table 1: Public Information
xh1 x
h
2 L
h
1 L
h
2 L
h Uh
A 33.5711 5.7761 56.8262 8.4821 65.3084 3.1714
B 29.5513 2.1071 58.0731 7.0630 65.1361 3.0296
p1 p2 wh yh = eh
A
1 1.0956
0.6109 39.8994
B 0.4891 31.8598
εh11 ε
h
12 ε
h
1L ε
h
21 ε
h
22 ε
h
2L ε
h
L1 ε
h
L2 ε
h
LL
A -0.7406 0.1400 0.6005 -0.6779 -2.5079 3.1858 0.1108 -0.1214 0.0106
B -0.7053 0.1590 0.5462 -1.8584 -5.1337 6.9921 0.1387 -0.1520 0.0133
From table 1 it is possible to verify that good 1 is a pseudo-necessity since
εA1L = 0.6005 < 1 and ε
B
1L = 0.5462 < 1 and the good 2 is a pseudo-luxury
since εA2L = 3.1854 ≥ 1 and εB2L = 6.9921 ≥ 14. From table 1 it is also possible
to verify that wA > wB and p2 > p1 (with p1 as numeraire).
Moreover—given the utility and the production functions—the following
results have been obtained: (i) the labour supply of more efficient individuals
A is higher than the labour supply of less efficient individuals B (LA > LB),
(ii) both the more efficient individuals A and the less efficient individuals B
contribute more to the production of the pseudo-necessary good 1 (Lh1 > L
h
2),
but (iii) the less efficient individualsB contribute more than the more efficient
4Both intuitively and empirically (see, among others, Kokoski, 2003) necessities are less
price sensitive (i.e. they have an inelastic demand) and luxuries are more price sensitive
(i.e. they have an elastic demand); in fact, table 1 shows also that |εh11| < 1 and |εh22| ≥ 1
(h = A,B).
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individuals A to the production of the pseudo-necessary good 1 (LB1 > L
A
1 )
and (iv) the more efficient individualsA contribute more than the less efficient
individuals B to the production of the pseudo-luxury good 2 (LA2 > L
B
2 ).
3.1. Redistribution System & Public Provision of the Pseudo-necessity
Out of the taxation revenues, the Government publicly provides the good
i = 1 (the pseudo-necessity) and each individual h = A,B receives the
quantity xG. Therefore the ex-post household’s problem (UMP) is
Uh = max
xh,`h
U
(
xh1 + xG, x
h
2 , `
h
)
s.t.
∑
i=1,2
qi · xhi +mh · `h ≤ mh · T
(
λh
) (21)
(see, among others, Deaton and Muellbauer, 1981; Kaiser, 1993). The FOCs
of the UMP (21) yield:
qi =
1
λh
· ∂Uh
∂xhi
mh = 1
λh
· ∂Uh
∂`h
.
(22)
Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution is:
MRS1,2 =
q1
q2
=
∂Uh
xh1
∂Uh
xh2
, (23)
and with λh = ∂U
h
∂`h
· 1
mh
it is also possible to write:
∂Uh
∂xhi
=
∂Uh
∂`h
· qi
mh
. (24)
The demand of good i by individual h is xhi = xi(q,m
h, xG) and the leisure
demand by individual h is `h = `(q,mh, xG), with q = (q1, q2). Moreover,
the elasticities in (10) can be rewritten as:
εhij =
∂xi(q,mh,xG)
∂qj
· qj
xhi
= Shij · qjxj , εhLj =
∂L(q,mh,xG)
∂qj
· qj
Lh
= ShLj · qjLh ,
εhiL =
∂xi(q,mh,xG)
∂mh
· mh
xhi
= IhiL · m
h
xhi
, εhLL =
∂L(q,mh,xG)
∂mh
· mh
Lh
= IhLL · m
h
Lh
(25)
with i, j = 1, 2. If the good i = 1 is a pseudo-necessity then the pseudo-
income elasticity is between 0 and 1, that is 0 ≤ εh1L < 1⇒ 0 ≤ ∂x
h
1
∂mh
· mh
xh1
<
9
1 ⇒ ∂xh1
∂mh
<
xh1
mh
, and if the good i = 2 is a pseudo-luxury then the pseudo-
income elasticity is greater than 1, that is εh2L ≥ 1⇒ ∂x
h
2
∂mh
· mh
xh2
≥ 1⇒ ∂xh2
∂mh
≥
xh2
mh
.
The Government redistribute resources among individuals through indi-
rect taxes t = (t1, t2), direct taxes τ = (τ
A, τB) and the publicly provided
good G. Denoting Vh = V(t, τh, xG; p, wh), xhi = xi(t, τh, xG; p, wh) and
Lh = L(t, τh, xG; p, w
h), the Government Problem (GP) is:
W = max
t,τ ,xG
W
(
piA · VA, piB · VB)
s.t.
∑
h=A,B
pih ·
(
τh · Lh + ∑
i=1,2
ti · xhi
)
≥ p1 · xG (λG) .
(26)
Considering the elasticities in (25) the FOCs of the GP (26) are:
∑
h=A,B
pih·(τh·εhL1·Lh+
∑
i=1,2
ti·εhi1·xhi )
q1·x1 = −1− 1λG ·
∑
h=A,B
pih·βh1
x1
,∑
h=A,B
pih·(τh·εhL2·Lh+
∑
i=1,2
ti·εhi2·xhi )
q2·x2 = −1− 1λG ·
∑
h=A,B
pih·βh2
x2
,
τA·εALL·LA+
∑
i=1,2
ti·εAiL·xAi
mA·LA = 1− 1λG ·
βAL
LA
,
τB ·εBLL·LB+
∑
i=1,2
ti·εBiL·xBi
mB ·LB = 1− 1λG ·
βBL
LB
,∑
h=A,B
pih ·
(
τh · ∂Lh
∂xG
+
∑
i=1,2
ti · ∂x
h
i
∂xG
)
= p1 − 1λG ·
∑
h=A,B
pih · βhG,
(27)
where βhi =
∂W
∂Vh · ∂V
h
∂qi
is the (gross) marginal social evaluation of individual
h’s utility with respect to good i, βhL =
∂W
∂Vh · ∂V
h
∂mh
is the (gross) marginal social
evaluation of the h’s utility with respect to labour L and βhG =
∂W
∂Vh · ∂V
h
∂xG
is
the (gross) marginal social evaluation of the h’s utility with respect to the
publicly provided good G.
Considering a log transformation of the KR-SG utility function, the UMP
(21) is:
Uh = max
xh,Lh
α · ln (xh1 + xG − b1)+ β · ln (xh2 − b2)+
+γ · ln ((T − Lh)− b`)
s.t.
∑
i=1,2
qi · xhi ≤ mh · Lh
(
λh
)
,
(28)
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and with ϕ
(
t, τh, xG; p, w
h
)
= mh · (T − b`) + q1 · xG−
∑
i=1,2
qi · bi the demand
system of individual h = A,B for the goods i = 1, 2 and leisure ` is:
xh1 + xG = b1 + α ·
ϕ(t,τh,xG;p,wh)
q1
,
xh2 = b2 + β ·
ϕ(t,τh,xG;p,wh)
q2
,
T − Lh = b` + γ · ϕ(t,τ
h,xG;p,w
h)
mh
.
(29)
Hence with ϕh = ϕ
(
t, τh, xG; p, w
h
)
the indirect utility of individual h is:
V (t, τh, xG; p, wh) = α·ln(α · ϕh
q1
)
+β ·ln
(
β · ϕ
h
q2
)
+γ ·ln
(
γ · ϕ
h
mh
)
(30)
and, with Vh = V (t, τh, xG; p, wh), xhi = xi(t, τh, xG; p, wh) and Lh =
L(t, τh, xG; p, w
h), the GP (26) is:
W = max
t,τ,xG
∑
h=A,B
βh · pih · Vh
s.t.
∑
h=A,B
pih ·
(
τh · Lh + ∑
i=1,2
ti · xhi
)
≥ p1 · xG (λG) ,
(31)
where βh is the weight assigned by the Government to individual h. There-
fore, the FOCs (27) are obtained, where the elasticities εh1j, ε
h
2j and ε
h
Lj (with
j = 1, 2, L) in (25) and the (gross) marginal social evaluations of h’s utility
of good i = 1, 2, labour L and the publicly provided good G are provided in
Appendix D (see equations in (D.4), (D.5), (D.6) and (D.7)).
Moreover, the FOC with respect to xG implies:
∑
h=A,B
pih ·
(
τh · ∂Lh
∂xG
+
∑
i=1,2
ti · ∂x
h
i
∂xG
)
=∑
h=A,B
pih · q1 ·
(
α · t1
q1
+ β · t2
q2
− γ · τh
mh
)
− t1.
(32)
Therefore, the public provision xG is function of the ratios between indirect
taxes and consumer prices ti
qi
(i = 1, 2) and between direct taxes and net
wage rates τ
h
mh
(h = A,B).
The simulation is implemented considering both the Utilitarian social
welfare function βA = βB = 1 (see tables 2 and 3) and the Rawlsian social
welfare function βA < βB (see tables 4 and 5).
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There exists a set of possible redistribution systems (t,τ, xG) which max-
imize the social welfare function W in (31): while tables 2 and 4 show the
redistribution system characterized by t1, t2 > 0 and τ
A, τB < 0 (i.e. while
the goods i = 1, 2 are taxed, the wage rates of both individuals h = A,B
are subsidized), tables 3 and 5 show the redistribution system characterized
by t1, t2, τ
B < 0 and τA > 0 (i.e. while the wage rate of individual h = A
is taxed, both the goods i = 1, 2 and the wage rate of individual h = B are
subsidized).
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 display (i) quantities and utilities, (ii) prices, taxa-
tion levels and expenditures, (iii) elasticities and (iv) (gross) marginal social
evaluations.
Table 2: Redistribution System with Public Information: the Utilitarian case (βA = βB =
1) with t1, t2 > 0 and τ
A, τB < 0
xG x
h
1 x
h
2 L
h
1 L
h
2 L
h Uh W
A
0.0056
31.5799 3.9615 56.7597 8.4685 65.2281 3.1052
3.1043
B 31.5312 3.9171 58.1561 7.0700 65.2260 3.1035
p1 t1 q1 p2 t2 q2 wh τh mh yh = eh
A
1 0.2413 1.2413 1.0957 0.2644 1.3601
0.6117 -0.0719 0.6836 44.5877
B 0.4884 -0.1933 0.6817 44.4668
εh11 ε
h
12 ε
h
1L ε
h
21 ε
h
22 ε
h
2L ε
h
L1 ε
h
L2 ε
h
LL
A -0.7243 0.1489 0.5755 -0.9879 -3.1986 4.1865 0.1230 -0.1348 0.0118
B -0.7239 0.1491 0.5748 -0.9991 -3.2236 4.2227 0.1233 -0.1352 0.0119
βhG β
h
1 β
h
2 β
h
L
A 0.01776 -0.4517 -0.0567 0.9331
B 0.01780 -0.4522 -0.0562 0.9355
Tables 2 and 3 allow to appreciate that in the Utilitarian case both the
redistribution systems (t1, t2 > 0; τ
A, τB < 0) and (t1, t2, τ
B < 0; τA > 0) lead
to the same outcome (i.e., same utilities). Moreover, the public provision xG
is positive, yet very low.
Tables 4 and 5 allow to appreciate that also in the Rawlsian case both
the redistribution systems (t1, t2 > 0; τ
A, τB < 0) and (t1, t2, τ
B < 0; τA > 0)
lead to the same outcome (i.e., same utilities), while the public provision xG
is zero.
Obviously both in the Utilitarian case and in the Rawlsian case the re-
distribution systems make type A individuals worse off (tables 2 and 3 show
that 3.1052 < 3.1714 and tables 4 and 5 that 3.1043 < 3.1714) and type B
individuals better off (tables 2 and 3 show that 3.1035 > 3.0296 and tables
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Table 3: Redistribution System with Public Information: the Utilitarian case (βA = βB =
1) with t1, t2, τ
B < 0 and τA > 0
xG x
h
1 x
h
2 L
h
1 L
h
2 L
h Uh W
A
0.0056
31.5799 3.9615 56.7597 8.4685 65.2281 3.1052
3.1043
B 31.5312 3.9171 58.1561 7.0700 65.2260 3.1035
p1 t1 q1 p2 t2 q2 wh τh mh yh = eh
A
1 -0.1074 0.8926 1.0957 -0.1177 0.9780
0.6116 0.1201 0.4915 32.0615
B 0.4884 -0.0018 0.4902 31.9746
εh11 ε
h
12 ε
h
1L ε
h
21 ε
h
22 ε
h
2L ε
h
L1 ε
h
L2 ε
h
LL
A -0.7243 0.1489 0.5755 -0.9879 -3.1986 4.1865 0.1230 -0.1348 0.0118
B -0.7239 0.1491 0.5748 -0.9991 -3.2236 4.2227 0.1233 -0.1352 0.0119
βhG β
h
1 β
h
2 β
h
L
A 0.01776 -0.6282 -0.0788 1.2976
B 0.01780 -0.6289 -0.0781 1.3010
4 and 5 that 3.1043 > 3.0296).
Finally, it is appropriate to stress the difference between the Utilitarian
case and the Rawlsian case: tables 2 and 3 show that UA > UB and tables 4
and 5 that UA = UB = W . However, the Utilitarian social welfare function
and the Rawlsian social welfare function lead to the same welfare level: W =
3.1043.
4. Moral Hazard
In what follows it is analysed the redistribution problem when the individual
types h = A,B are observable, but the labour choice Lh and the consumption
choices xhi made by the individuals belonging to both groups h = A,B are
not observable. The moral hazard equilibrium is analysed applying the first-
order condition approach (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
Ex-post the individuals maximize their utility given the direct and indirect
taxation levels and the public provision of the pseudo-necessity :
U˜h = max
x˜h,L˜h
U
(
x˜h1 + xG, x˜
h
2 , T − L˜h
)
s.t.
∑
i=1,2
pi · x˜hi +
∑
i=1,2
ti · xhi ≤ wh · L˜h − τh · Lh
(
λ˜h
) (33)
with x˜hi > x
h
i and L˜
h > Lh, where xhi and L
h are the solution of the UMP
(21).
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Table 4: Redistribution System with Public Information: the Rawlsian case (βA = 0.9987
and βB = 1.0013) with t1, t2 > 0 and τ
A, τB < 0
xG x
h
1 x
h
2 L
h
1 L
h
2 L
h Uh W
A
0
31.5621 3.9402 56.7604 8.4702 65.2306 3.1043
3.1043
B 31.5621 3.9402 58.1590 7.0716 65.2306 3.1043
p1 t1 q1 p2 t2 q2 wh τh mh yh = eh
A
1 0.8369 1.8369 1.0957 0.9170 2.0127
0.6117 -0.3987 1.0104 65.9076
B 0.4884 -0.5220 1.0104 65.9076
εh11 ε
h
12 ε
h
1L ε
h
21 ε
h
22 ε
h
2L ε
h
L1 ε
h
L2 ε
h
LL
A -0.7240 0.1489 0.5751 -0.9936 -3.2106 4.2042 0.1232 -0.1350 0.0118
B -0.7240 0.1489 0.5751 -0.9936 -3.2106 4.2042 0.1232 -0.1350 0.0118
βhG β
h
1 β
h
2 β
h
L
A 0.01778 -0.3055 -0.0381 0.6313
B 0.01778 -0.3055 -0.0381 0.6313
The Government implements the redistribution system (taxation levels ti
and τh and public provision xG) given that both type A and type B individ-
uals choose the optimal demand systems for the goods i = 1, 2 and leisure
` in response to the redistribution system itself, i.e. subject to the incen-
tive constraints (see Platoni, 2010). Therefore, the Government considers
the commodity demands x˜hi = x˜
h
i (t, τ
h, xG; p, w
h), the labour supply L˜h =
L˜h(t, τh, xG; p, w
h) and hence the indirect utility V˜h = V˜ (t, τh, xG; p, wh).
Using a log transformation of the KR-SG utility function, the UMP (33)
is:
U˜h = max
x˜h,L˜h
α · ln (x˜h1 + xG − b1)+ β · ln (x˜h2 − b2)+
+γ · ln
((
T − L˜h
)
− b`
)
s.t.
∑
i=1,2
pi · x˜hi +
∑
i=1,2
ti · xhi ≤ wh · L˜h − τh · Lh
(
λ˜h
)
.
(34)
Imposing xhi = x˜
h
i and L
h = L˜h and considering ϕ˜
(
t, τh, xG; p, w
h
)
=
mh·(T−b`)+q1·xG−
∑
i=1,2
qi·bi
α· q1
p1
+β· q2
p2
+γ·mh
wh
, the demand system of individual h = A,B for the
goods i = 1, 2 and leisure ` is:
x˜h1 + xG = b1 + α ·
ϕ˜(t,τh,xG;p,wh)
p1
,
x˜h2 = b2 + β ·
ϕ˜(t,τh,xG;p,wh)
p2
,
T − L˜h = b` + γ · ϕ˜(t,τ
h,xG;p,w
h)
wh
;
(35)
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Table 5: Redistribution System with Public Information: the Rawlsian case (βA = 0.9987
and βB = 1.0013) with t1, t2, τ
B < 0 and τA > 0
xG x
h
1 x
h
2 L
h
1 L
h
2 L
h Uh W
A
0
31.5621 3.9402 56.7604 8.4702 65.2306 3.1043
3.1043
B 31.5621 3.9402 58.1590 7.0716 65.2306 3.1043
p1 t1 q1 p2 t2 q2 wh τh mh yh = eh
A
1 -0.1061 0.8939 1.0957 -0.1162 0.9795
0.6117 0.1200 0.4917 32.0729
B 0.4884 -0.0033 0.4917 32.0729
εh11 ε
h
12 ε
h
1L ε
h
21 ε
h
22 ε
h
2L ε
h
L1 ε
h
L2 ε
h
LL
A -0.7240 0.1489 0.5751 -0.9936 -3.2106 4.2042 0.1232 -0.1350 0.0118
B -0.7240 0.1489 0.5751 -0.9936 -3.2106 4.2042 0.1232 -0.1350 0.0118
βhG β
h
1 β
h
2 β
h
L
A 0.01778 -0.6277 -0.0784 1.2973
B 0.01778 -0.6277 -0.0784 1.2973
then the demand system of individual h = A,B (35) is function of the ratios
between consumer and producer prices qi
pi
(i = 1, 2) and between net and gross
wage rates m
h
wh
. Hence, with ϕ˜h = ϕ˜
(
t, τh, xG; p, w
h
)
the indirect utility of
type h individuals is:
V˜ (t, τh, xG; p, wh) = α·ln(α · ϕ˜h
p1
)
+β ·ln
(
β · ϕ˜
h
p2
)
+γ ·ln
(
γ · ϕ˜
h
wh
)
. (36)
Therefore, from the GP (31) the FOCs (27) are obtained, where the
elasticities ε˜h1j, ε˜
h
2j and ε˜
h
Lj (with j = 1, 2, L) in (25) are provided in Appendix
D (see equations in (D.8), (D.9) and (D.10)).
Moreover, the FOC with respect to xG implies:
∑
h=A,B
pih ·
(
τh · ∂Lh
∂xG
+
∑
i=1,2
ti · ∂x
h
i
∂xG
)
=
∑
h=A,B
pih · q1 ·
α· t1
p1
+β· t2
p2
−γ· τh
wh
α· q1
p1
+β· q2
p2
+γ·mh
wh
− t1
(37)
and then the public provision xG is function not only of the ratios between
indirect taxes and producer prices ti
pi
(i = 1, 2) and between direct taxes and
gross wage rates τ
h
wh
(h = A,B), but also of the ratios between consumer
and producer prices qi
pi
(i = 1, 2) and between net and gross wage rates m
h
wh
(h = A,B).
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Both in the Utilitarian and in the Rawlsian case the only redistribution
system which maximizes the social welfare function W˜ in (31) is the “corner”
solution characterized by t1 = −p1 and then q1 = 05 (see tables 6 and 7).
This means that the residual demand of the pseudo-necessity is completely
subsidized6.
Tables 6 and 7 display (i) quantities and utilities, (ii) prices, taxation
levels and expenditures, (iii) elasticities and (iv) (gross) marginal social eval-
uations.
Table 6: Redistribution System with Moral Hazard: the Utilitarian case (βA = βB = 1)
with −t1 = p1
xG x
h
1 x
h
2 L
h
1 L
h
2 L
h Uh W
A
26.2676
4.9348 3.6880 59.1196 8.9326 68.0522 3.0642
3.1056
B 5.6288 4.3243 55.2860 6.8065 62.0925 3.1470
p1 t1 q1 p2 t2 q2 wh τh mh yh = eh
A
1 -1 0 1.0907 1.3973 2.4880
0.5870 0.4522 0.1348 9.1759
B 0.5136 0.3403 0.1733 10.7589
εh11 ε
h
12 ε
h
1L ε
h
21 ε
h
22 ε
h
2L ε
h
L1 ε
h
L2 ε
h
LL
A 0 -0.6771 1.2581 0 -0.9060 1.6835 0 0.0506 -0.0940
B 0 -0.6667 1.4158 0 -0.8678 1.8429 0 0.0623 -0.1322
βhG β
h
1 β
h
2 β
h
L
A 0 -0.1077 -0.0805 1.4849
B 0 -0.1133 -0.0871 1.2501
In presence of moral hazard the maximization of the Utilitarian social
welfare function leads to U˜A < U˜B, that is the more efficient individuals (type
A individuals) are worse off than the less efficient ones (type B individuals),
while with public information the more efficient individuals were better off
(see tables 2 and 3).
Therefore, the Rawlsian social welfare function does not benefit the less
efficient individuals (type B individuals), but the more efficient ones (type
A individuals): βA > 1 and βB < 1.
Indeed with moral hazard while in the Utilitarian case type A individuals
are worse off and type B individuals are better off (from table 6 U˜A < UA
with 3.0642 < 3.1052 < 3.1714 and U˜B > UB with 3.1470 > 3.1035 >
5The only solutions considered are those characterized by qi ≥ 0.
6Tables 6 and 7 show that the demand of the pseudo-necessity is perfectly inelastic, i.e.
εh11=0 (h = A,B).
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Table 7: Redistribution System with Moral Hazard: the Rawlsian case (βA = 1.0523 and
βB = 0.9477) with −t1 = p1
xG x
h
1 x
h
2 L
h
1 L
h
2 L
h Uh W
A
27.7443
4.3297 4.4585 58.2559 8.7557 67.0116 3.1054
3.1054
B 3.2809 3.4985 56.2901 6.8935 63.1837 3.1054
p1 t1 q1 p2 t2 q2 wh τh mh yh = eh
A
1 -1 0 1.0925 1.4082 2.5007
0.5957 0.4293 0.1664 11.1494
B 0.5044 0.3660 0.1384 8.7488
εh11 ε
h
12 ε
h
1L ε
h
21 ε
h
22 ε
h
2L ε
h
L1 ε
h
L2 ε
h
LL
A 0 -0.9148 1.6776 0 -0.8883 1.6291 0 0.0609 -0.1117
B 0 -0.9491 2.0556 0 -0.8900 1.9277 0 0.0508 -0.1100
βhG β
h
1 β
h
2 β
h
L
A 0 -0.0927 -0.0955 1.4349
B 0 -0.0671 -0.0715 1.2917
3.0296), in the Rawlsian case both type A and type B individuals are better
off (from table 7 U˜A > UA with 3.1054 > 3.1043 < 3.1714 and U˜B > UB
with 3.1054 > 3.1043 > 3.0296).
Finally, while in presence of public information the Utilitarian and Rawl-
sian social welfare functions have the same level (W = 3.1043), in case of
moral hazard the level of the Utilitarian social welfare function (W˜ = 3.1056
with U˜A < UA and U˜B > UB) is higher than the one of the Rawlsian
(W˜ = 3.1054 with U˜A > UA and U˜B > UB). However, the most appealing
result is that the social welfare function is higher with moral hazard (3.1056
and 3.1054) than with pubic information (3.1043).
5. Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
In what follows both the labour choice Lh and the consumption choice xhi
made by the individuals belonging to both groups h = A,B and the individ-
ual types h = A,B are not observable.
Therefore, ex-post while type B individuals decide to maximize their util-
ity given the direct and indirect taxation levels and the public provision of
the pseudo-necessity as in (33), type A individuals decide to maximize their
utility (i) given the direct and indirect taxation levels and the public pro-
vision of the pseudo-necessity and (ii) mimicking type B individuals since
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τB < τA and then UˆA > U˜A:
UˆA = max
xˆA,LˆA
U
(
xˆA1 + xG, xˆ
A
2 , T − LˆA
)
s.t.
∑
i=1,2
pi · xˆAi +
∑
i=1,2
ti · xBi ≤ wA · LˆA − τB · LB
(
λˆA
)
,
(38)
where xBi and L
B are the solution of the UMP (21).
The Government implements the redistribution system (taxation levels
ti and τ
h and public provision xG) given that type A and B individuals
choose the optimal demand systems for the goods i = 1, 2 and leisure `
in response to the redistribution system itself (incentive constraints) and
subject to the constraint (incentive-compatible or self-selection constraint)
that type A individuals should not mimic type B individuals (see Platoni,
2010). Therefore the GP is:
Wˇ = max
tˇ,τˇ ,xˇG
W
(
piA · VˇA, piB · VˇB)
s.t.
∑
h=A,B
pih ·
(
τˇh · Lˇh + ∑
i=1,2
tˇi · xˇhi
)
≥ p1 · xˇG
(
λˇG
)
VˇA ≥ VˆA (λAS) ,
(39)
where xˇhi = x˜i(tˇ, τˇ
h, xˇG; p, w
h), Lˇh = L˜(tˇ, τˇh, xˇG; p, w
h), Vˇh = V˜(tˇ, τˇh, xˇG;
p, wh) and VˆA = Vˆ(tˇ, τˇB, xˇG; p,w), with w = (wA, wB). From the GP (39)
it is possible to obtain the FOCs :
∑
h=A,B
pih·(τˇh·εˇhL1·Lˇh+
∑
i=1,2
tˇi·εˇhi1·xˇhi )
qˇ1·xˇ1 = −1− 1λˇG ·
∑
h=A,B
pih·βˇh1 +λAS ·σ1
xˇ1
,∑
h=A,B
pih·(τˇh·εˇhL2·Lˇh+
∑
i=1,2
tˇi·εˇhi2·xˇhi )
qˇ2·xˇ2 = −1− 1λˇG ·
∑
h=A,B
pih·βˇh2 +λAS ·σ2
xˇ2
,
τˇA·εˇALL·LˇA+
∑
i=1,2
tˇi·εˇAiL·xˇAi
mˇA·LˇA = 1− 1λˇG ·
βˇAL+
λAS
piA
·σA
LˇA
=
= 1− 1
λˇG
·
(
1+
λAS
piA
)
·βˇAL
LˇA
,
τˇB ·εˇBLL·LˇB+
∑
i=1,2
tˇi·εˇBiL·xˇBi
mˇB ·LˇB = 1− 1λˇG ·
βˇBL+
λAS
piB
·σˆA
LˇB
,∑
h=A,B
pih ·
(
τˇh · ∂Lˇh
∂xˇG
+
∑
i=1,2
tˇi · ∂xˇ
h
i
∂xˇG
)
= p1 − 1λˇG ·
∑
h=A,B
pih · βˇhG+
−λAS
λˇG
· σG,
(40)
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where σ1 =
∂Wˇ
∂VˇA · ∂Vˇ
A
∂qˇ1
− ∂Wˇ
∂VˆA · ∂Vˆ
A
∂qˇ1
, σ2 =
∂Wˇ
∂VˇA · ∂Vˇ
A
∂qˇ2
− ∂Wˇ
∂VˆA · ∂Vˆ
A
∂qˇ2
, σA = βˇAL =
∂Wˇ
∂VˇA · ∂Vˇ
A
∂mˇA
, σˆA = − ∂Wˇ
∂VˆA · ∂Vˆ
A
∂mˇB
and σG =
∂Wˇ
∂VˇA · ∂Vˇ
A
∂xˇG
− ∂Wˇ
∂VˆA · ∂Vˆ
A
∂xˇG
.
Considering a log transformation of the KR-SG utility function, the UMP
(38) is:
UˆA = max
xˆA,LˆA
α · ln (xˆA1 + xG − b1)+ β · ln (xˆA2 − b2)+
+γ · ln
((
T − LˆA
)
− b`
)
s.t.
∑
i=1,2
pi · xˆAi +
∑
i=1,2
ti · x˜Bi ≤ wA · LˆA − τB · L˜B
(
λˆA
)
,
(41)
and with ϕˆ
(
t, τB, xG; p,w
)
=
(
wA − wB) · (T − b`) + mB ·(T−b`)+q1·xG− ∑i=1,2qi·bi
α· q1
p1
+β· q2
p2
+γ·mB
wB
the demand system of the mimicking type A individuals for the goods i = 1, 2
and leisure ` is:
xˆA1 + xG = b1 + α ·
ϕˆ(t,τB ,xG;p,w)
p1
,
xˆA2 = b2 + β ·
ϕˆ(t,τB ,xG;p,w)
p2
,
T − LˆA = b` + γ · ϕˆ(t,τ
B ,xG;p,w)
wA
.
(42)
Therefore, the demand system of the mimicking type A individuals (42) is
function of the gap between type A and type B gross wage rates wA−wB and
of the ratios between consumer and producer prices qi
pi
(i = 1, 2) and between
net and gross wage rates of type B individuals m
B
wB
. Hence, with ϕˆA =
ϕˆ
(
t, τB, xG; p,w
)
the indirect utility of the mimicking type A individuals is:
Vˆ (t, τB, xG; p,w) = α · ln(α · ϕˆAp1 )+ β · ln(β · ϕˆAp2 )+
+γ · ln
(
γ · ϕˆA
wA
) (43)
and with VˆA = Vˆ (t, τB, xG; p,w) the GP is:
Wˇ = max
tˇ,τˇ ,xˇG
∑
h=A,B
βh · pih · Vˇh
s.t.
∑
h=A,B
pih ·
(
τˇh · Lˇh + ∑
i=1,2
tˇi · xˇhi
)
≥ p1 · xˇG
(
λˇG
)
VˇA ≥ VˆA (λAS)
(44)
which yields the FOCs in (40), where the elasticities εˇh1j, the elasticities εˇ
h
2j
and the elasticities εˇhLj, with j = 1, 2, L, are the same as in (D.8), (D.9) and
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(D.10), where the (gross) marginal social evaluations of the h’s utility with
respect to good i = 1, 2 (βˇhi ), to labour L (βˇ
h
L) and to publicly provided
good G (βˇhG) are the same as in (D.7), and where σ1, σ2, σ
A, σˆA and σG are
provided in Appendix D (see equations in (D.11)).
Since the value of λAS withdraws the effects of different values of the
weights βA and βB, the results of the Rawlsian case are equal to the results
of the Utilitarian case ∀βh. Moreover, the only redistribution system which
maximizes the social welfare function Wˇ in (44) is the “corner” solution
characterized by t1 = −p1 and then by q1 = 0 (see table 8), i.e. the residual
demand of the pseudo-necessity is completely subsidized7.
(i) Quantities and utilities, (ii) prices, taxation levels and expenditures,
(iii) elasticities and (iv) (gross) marginal social evaluations are displayed in
table 8. In addition the simulation yields σ1 = −0.0703, σ2 = −0.0639,
σA =
βˇAL
βA
= 1.1939, σˆA = 1.2891 and σG = 0.
Table 8: Redistribution System with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection with −t1 = p1
xG x
h
1 x
h
2 L
h
1 L
h
2 L
h Uh W
A
27.4092
6.1619 5.7761 56.8262 8.4821 65.3084 3.1714
3.1005
B 2.1421 2.1071 58.0731 7.0630 65.1361 3.0296
p1 t1 q1 p2 t2 q2 wh τh mh yh = eh
A
1 -1 0 1.0956 1.4086 2.5042
0.6109 0.3894 0.2215 14.4645
B 0.4891 0.4081 0.0810 5.2765
εh11 ε
h
12 ε
h
1L ε
h
21 ε
h
22 ε
h
2L ε
h
L1 ε
h
L2 ε
h
LL
A 0 -0.8057 1.4449 0 -0.8595 1.5414 0 0.0783 -0.1405
B 0 -0.9153 2.0503 0 -0.9305 2.0843 0 0.0310 -0.0695
βhG β
h
1 β
h
2 β
h
L
A 0 -0.1126 -0.1056 1.1939
B 0 -0.0527 -0.0518 1.6022
In absence of a tax evasion fine the utilities obtained under both moral
hazard and adverse selection are the same as those obtained without Gov-
ernment intervention (compare tables 1 and 8): UˇA = UA = 3.1714 and
UˇB = UB = 3.0296.
7Table 8 shows that the demand of the pseudo-necessity is perfectly inelastic, i.e. εh11=0
(h = A,B).
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5.1. Tax Evasion Fine
This section assumes the Government may audit the individuals who
have hidden information (tax evasion by adverse selection) such that the
Government intervenes to punish only tax evasion by adverse selection.
If type A individuals have hidden information, their expected indirect
utility is:
E
(
VˆA
)
= (1− pi) · Vˆ (t, τB, xG; p,w)+ pi · Vˆ (t, τB, xG, FˆA; p,w) (45)
with pi the probability of being audited and FˆA the fine applied in case of
tax evasion by adverse selection.
The Government decides both the optimal redistribution system
(
t˘, τ˘ , x˘G
)
and the amount of the fine FˆA. Therefore, the GP is:
W˘ = max
t˘,τ˘ ,x˘G,FˆA
W
(
piA · V˘A, piB · V˘B
)
s.t.
∑
h=A,B
pih ·
(
τ˘h · L˘h + ∑
i=1,2
t˘i · x˘hi
)
≥ p1 · x˘G
(
λ˘G
)
V˘A ≥ E
(
VˆA
)
(λAS) ,
(46)
where V˘h = V˜(t˘, τ˘h, x˘G; p, wh) and with x˘hi = x˜i(t˘, τ˘h, x˘G; p, wh) and L˘h =
L˜(t˘, τ˘h, x˘G; p, w
h). Since
−λAS ·
∂E
(
VˆA
)
∂FˆA
= 0→ λAS = 0 (47)
the problem reverts to the FOCs in (27), where the elasticities are the ones
in (D.8), (D.9) and (D.10) and where the (gross) marginal social evaluations
of the h’s utility are the ones in (D.7). Therefore FˆA is determined from
V˘A = E
(
VˆA
)
.
As in the previous sections, a log transformation of the KR-SG utility
function is considered. If type A individuals have hidden information their
demand system for the goods i = 1, 2 and leisure ` is the one in (42) when
not audited, while when audited is:
xˆA1 + xG = b1 + α ·
ϕˆ(t,τB ,xG,FˆA;p,w)
p1
,
xˆA2 = b2 + β ·
ϕˆ(t,τB ,xG,FˆA;p,w)
p2
,
T − LˆA = b` + γ · ϕˆ(t,τ
B ,xG,Fˆ
A;p,w)
wA
(48)
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with ϕˆ
(
t, τB, xG, Fˆ
A; p,w
)
= ϕˆ
(
t, τB, xG; p,w
)− FˆA.
Considering an audit probability pi = 0.5, in the Utilitarian case the
results obtained are equal to those displayed in table 6 with FˆA = 17.5105
and in the Rawlsian case the results are equal to those displayed in table 7
with FˆA = 11.3464 (i.e., reversion to the moral hazard outcomes).
In Appendix E it is assumed the Government may audit both the indi-
viduals having hidden information (tax evasion by adverse selection) and the
individuals taking hidden actions (tax evasion by moral hazard); obviously
there is a reversion to the public information outcomes (see tables 2, 3, 4 and
5).
6. Conclusions
The article considers an economy characterized by two commodities (the
pseudo-necessity and the pseudo-luxury) and by two individual types (the
more efficient and the less efficient workers) and analyses a redistribution
system implemented through direct and indirect taxation and the public
provision of the pseudo-necessity.
When the economy is characterized by moral hazard only, (i) the level of
social welfare is higher than the level achieved in case of public information
and (ii) if the Government maximizes an Utilitarian social welfare function
the more efficient individuals are worse off than the less efficient ones.
Hence to face the tax evasion by moral hazard the Government can im-
pose the incentive constraints8 without limiting, but rather strengthening,
the redistributive purposes of the taxation system (with the public provi-
sion of the pseudo-necessity). On the contrary, if the Government faced the
tax evasion both by moral hazard and adverse selection imposing not only
the incentive constraints, but also the incentive-compatible (or self-selection)
constraints, then the Government would not reach the redistributive aim of
the public intervention.
Therefore, if individuals not only take hidden actions (tax evasion by
moral hazard), but they also exploit hidden information (tax evasion by
adverse selection), the Government succeeds in redistributing resources only
if a tax evasion fine is established. Hence, as suggested by Cremer and
8In Italy the policy tools representing the incentive constraints are the “studi di set-
tore”and the “redditometro”.
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Gahavari (1993), the set of Government policy tools should include the audit
strategy as well as the tax rates.
Appendices
A. Properties of the Walrasian Demand Functions
The implications of homogeneity of degree zero come from xi(p, w
h, I) =
xi(α · p, α · wh, α · I) and `(p, wh, I) = `(α · p, α · wh, α · I). Differentiating
these expressions with respect to α and evaluating the derivative at α = 1
allows to get the results (A.1).
Proposition A.1. (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995) If the Walrasian demand
functions xi(p, w
h, I) and `(p, wh, I) are homogeneous of degree zero in p,
wh and I, then for all p, wh and I:
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂I
· I + ∑
j=1,2
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂pj
· pj + ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂wh
· wh = 0,
∂`(p,wh,I)
∂I
· I + ∑
j=1,2
∂`(p,wh,I)
∂pj
· pj + ∂`(p,w
h,I)
∂wh
· wh = 0.
(A.1)
By the Walras’ law, it is known that:∑
i=1,2
pi · xi
(
p, wh, I
)
+ wh · ` (p, wh, I) = wh · T + I (A.2)
and then: ∑
i=1,2
pi · xi
(
p, wh, I
)
+ wh · (` (p, wh, I)− T) =
=
∑
i=1,2
pi · xi
(
p, wh, I
)− wh · L (p, wh, I) = I (A.3)
for all p, wh and I.
Proposition A.2. (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995) If the Walrasian demand
functions xi(p, w
h, I) and `(p, wh, I) satisfy the Walras’ law, then for all p
and wh: ∑
i=1,2
pi · ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂I
+ wh · ∂`(p,w
h,I)
∂I
=
=
∑
i=1,2
pi · ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂I
− wh · ∂L(p,w
h,I)
∂I
= 1.
(A.4)
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Proposition A.3. (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995) If the Walrasian demand
functions xi(p, w
h, I) and `(p, wh, I) satisfy the Walras’ law, then for all p
and wh: ∑
i=1,2
pi · ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂pj
+ wh · ∂`(p,w
h,I)
∂pj
+ xj
(
p, wh, I
)
=
=
∑
i=1,2
pi · ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂pj
− wh · ∂L(p,w
h,I)
∂pj
+ xj
(
p, wh, I
)
= 0,∑
i=1,2
pi · ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂wh
+ wh · ∂`(p,w
h,I)
∂wh
+
(
`
(
p, wh, I
)− T) =
=
∑
i=1,2
pi · ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂wh
− wh · ∂L(p,w
h,I)
∂wh
− L (p, wh, I) = 0.
(A.5)
B. Hicksian Demands, Slutsky Equations and Roy’s Identities
Proposition B.1. (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995) Suppose that U(·) is a con-
tinuous utility function representing a locally nonsatiated and strictly convex
preference relation < defined on the consumption set (x1,x2,L) = R3+. For all
p, wh and U , the Hicksian demands hi(p, w
h, U) for i = 1, 2 and hL(p, w
h, U)
are:
hi
(
p, wh, U
)
=
∂e(p,wh,U)
∂pi
,
hL
(
p, wh, U
)
= −∂e(p,w
h,U)
∂wh
.
(B.1)
Proof B.1. (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995) Using the chain rule, the change
in expenditure:
e
(
p, wh, U
)
=
∑
i=1,2
pi · hi
(
p, wh, U
)− wh · hL (p, wh, U) (B.2)
can be written as:
∂e(p,wh,U)
∂pi
= hi
(
p, wh, U
)
+
+
∑
j=1,2
pj · ∂hj(p,w
h,U)
∂pi
− wh · ∂hL(p,w
h,U)
∂pi
,
∂e(p,wh,U)
∂wh
= −hL
(
p, wh, U
)
+
+
∑
j=1,2
pi · ∂hi(p,w
h,U)
∂wh
− wh · ∂hL(p,w
h,U)
∂wh
.
(B.3)
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From equation (8) of the EMP (7) it is possible to write:
∂e(p,wh,U)
∂pi
= hi
(
p, wh, U
)
+ νh ·
( ∑
j=1,2
∂Uh
∂xhj
· ∂hhj
∂pi
− ∂Uh
∂Lh
· ∂hhL
∂pi
)
,
∂e(p,wh,U)
∂wh
= −hL
(
p, wh, U
)
+ νh ·
( ∑
j=1,2
∂Uh
∂xhj
· ∂hhi
∂wh
− ∂Uh
∂Lh
· ∂hhL
∂wh
)
.
(B.4)
Since the constraint U(xh, T − Lh) = U(h1(p, wh, U), h2(p, wh, U), T −
hL(p, w
h, U)) = U holds for all p and wh, it is known that:∑
j=1,2
∂Uh
∂xhj
· ∂hhj
∂pi
− ∂Uh
∂Lh
· ∂hhL
∂pi
= 0,∑
j=1,2
∂Uh
∂xhj
· ∂hhi
∂wh
− ∂Uh
∂Lh
· ∂hhL
∂wh
= 0
(B.5)
and then the (B.1) is obtained.
Proposition B.2. Slutsky Equations (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995) Sup-
pose that U(·) is a continuous utility function representing a locally non-
satiated and strictly convex preference relation < defined on the consumption
set (x1,x2,L) = R3+. Then, for all (p, wh) and U = V(p, wh, I) it is possible
to write:
Shij =
∂hi(p,wh,U)
∂pj
=
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂pj
+
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂I
· xj
(
p, wh, I
)
,
ShLj =
∂hL(p,wh,U)
∂pj
=
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂pj
+
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂I
· xj
(
p, wh, I
)
;
ShiL =
∂hi(p,wh,U)
∂wh
=
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂pj
− ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂I
· L (p, wh, I) ,
ShLL =
∂hL(p,wh,U)
∂wh
=
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂pj
− ∂L(p,w
h,I)
∂I
· L (p, wh, I) .
(B.6)
(see Hicks, 1946). Therefore, the overall effect of a price change or of a wage
change can be decomposed into a substitution effect and an income effect (see
Abbott and Ashenfelter, 1976):
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂pj
= Shij −
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂I
· xj
(
p, wh, I
)
,
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂pj
= ShLj −
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂I
· xj
(
p, wh, I
)
;
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂pj
= ShiL +
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂I
· L (p, wh, I) ,
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂pj
= ShLL +
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂I
· L (p, wh, I) .
(B.7)
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Proof B.2. (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995) Since e(p, wh, U) =
∑
i=1,2
pi·xhi−xhi−
wh·Lh, differentiating hi(p, wh, U) = xi(p, wh, e(p, wh, U)) and hL(p, wh, U) =
L(p, wh, e(p, wh, U)) with respect to pj and w
h and evaluating at (p, wh, U),
allows to get:
∂hi(p,wh,U)
∂pj
=
∂xi(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂pj
+
∂xi(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂I
· ∂e(p,w
h,U)
∂pj
,
∂hL(p,wh,U)
∂pj
=
∂L(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂pj
+
∂L(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂I
· ∂e(p,w
h,U)
∂pj
;
∂hi(p,wh,U)
∂wh
=
∂xi(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂wh
+
∂xi(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂I
· ∂e(p,w
h,U)
∂wh
,
∂hL(p,wh,U)
∂wh
=
∂L(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂wh
+
∂L(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂I
· ∂e(p,w
h,U)
∂wh
.
(B.8)
Using equation (B.3) yields
∂hi(p,wh,U)
∂pj
=
∂xi(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂pj
+
∂xi(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂I
· hj
(
p, wh, U
)
,
∂hL(p,wh,U)
∂pj
=
∂L(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂pj
+
∂L(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂I
· hj
(
p, wh, U
)
;
∂hi(p,wh,U)
∂wh
=
∂xi(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂wh
+
∂xi(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂I
· hL
(
p, wh, U
)
,
∂hL(p,wh,U)
∂wh
=
∂L(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂wh
+
∂L(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂I
· hL
(
p, wh, U
)
.
(B.9)
Finally since e(p, wh, U) = I, hi(p, w
h, U) = xi(p, w
h, I) and hL(p, w
h, U) =
L(p, wh, I) the equations in (B.6) are obtained.
Proposition B.3. Roy’s Identities (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995) Suppose
that U(·) is a continuous utility function representing a locally non-satiated
and strictly convex preference relation < defined on the consumption set
(x1,x2,L) = R3+. Suppose also that the indirect utility function is differ-
entiable at (p¯, w¯) 0. Then
∂V(p,wh,I)
∂pj
= −∂V(p,w
h,I)
∂I
· xj
(
p, wh, I
)
,
∂V(p,wh,I)
∂wh
=
∂V(p,wh,I)
∂I
· L (p, wh, I) . (B.10)
Proof B.3. First Proof (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995) Assume that xi(p, w
h, I)
and L(p, wh, I) are differentiable and xi(p¯, w¯
h, I¯)  0 and L(p¯, w¯h, I¯)  0.
By the chain rule it is possible to write:
∂V(p,wh,I)
∂pj
=
∑
i=1,2
∂Uh
∂xhi
· ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂pj
− ∂Uh
∂`h
· ∂L(p,w
h,I)
∂pj
,
∂V(p,wh,I)
∂wh
=
∑
i=1,2
∂Uh
∂xhi
· ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂wh
− ∂Uh
∂`h
· ∂L(p,w
h,I)
∂wh
.
(B.11)
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Substituting ∂U
h
∂xhi
= λh · pi and ∂Uh∂`h = λh · wh and using the FOCs in (4) of
the UMP in (3) yields:
∂V(p,wh,I)
∂pj
= λh ·
( ∑
i=1,2
pi · ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂pj
− wh · ∂L(p,w
h,I)
∂pj
)
,
∂V(p,wh,I)
∂wh
= λh ·
( ∑
i=1,2
pi · ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂wh
− wh · ∂L(p,w
h,I)
∂wh
)
.
(B.12)
If the Walrasian demand functions xi(p, w
h, I) and `(p, wh, I) satisfy the
Walras’ law, i.e. the equations in (A.5), then
∂V(p,wh,I)
∂pj
= −λh · xj
(
p, wh, I
)
,
∂V(p,wh,I)
∂wh
= λh · L (p, wh, I) . (B.13)
By the chain rule, the change in utility from a marginal increase in I is given
by
∂V (p, wh, I)
∂I
=
∑
i=1,2
∂Uh
∂xhi
· ∂xi
(
p, wh, I
)
∂I
− ∂U
h
∂`h
· ∂L
(
p, wh, I
)
∂I
. (B.14)
From the FOCs (4) of the UMP (3) it is possible to write:
∂V (p, wh, I)
∂I
= λh ·
(∑
i=1,2
pi ·
∂xi
(
p, wh, I
)
∂I
− wh · ∂L
(
p, wh, I
)
∂I
)
(B.15)
and the (A.4) allows to obtain the marginal utility of income:
∂V (p, wh, I)
∂I
= λh. (B.16)
Therefore the (B.10) is obtained.
Second Proof (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995) Assume U = V(p, wh, I).
Since V(p, wh, e(p, wh, U)) = U holds for all p and wh, differentiating with
respect to pj and evaluating at pj = p¯j yields to:
∂V(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂pj
+
∂V(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂I
· ∂e(p,w
h,U)
∂pj
= 0,
∂V(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂wh
+
∂V(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂I
· ∂e(p,w
h,U)
∂wh
= 0.
(B.17)
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Substituting the (B.1) into the (B.17) allows to get:
∂V(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂pj
+
∂V(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂I
· hi
(
p, wh, U
)
= 0,
∂V(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂wh
+
∂V(p,wh,e(p,wh,U))
∂I
· hL
(
p, wh, U
)
= 0.
(B.18)
Finally, since e(p, wh, U) = I, the (B.10) is obtained.
C. Substitution and Income Effects
Consider the Walrasian demand functions xi(p, w
h, I) and `(p, wh, I) allows
to relate the Hicksian and Walrasian demands as follows:
hi
(
p, wh, U
)
= xi
(
p, wh, e
(
p, wh, U
))
,
hL
(
p, wh, U
)
= L
(
p, wh, e
(
p, wh, U
))
;
xi
(
p, wh, I
)
= hi
(
p, wh,V (p, wh, I)) ,
L
(
p, wh, I
)
= hL
(
p, wh,V (p, wh, I)) . (C.1)
The equations (B.6) can be rewritten as:
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂pj
=
∂hi(p,wh,U)
∂pj
− ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂I
· xj
(
p, wh, I
)
=
= Shij −
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂I
· xj
(
p, wh, I
)
,
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂pj
=
∂hL(p,wh,U)
∂pj
− ∂L(p,w
h,I)
∂I
· xj
(
p, wh, I
)
=
= ShLj −
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂I
· xj
(
p, wh, I
)
;
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂pj
=
∂hi(p,wh,U)
∂wh
+
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂I
· L (p, wh, I) =
= ShiL +
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂I
· L (p, wh, I) ,
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂pj
=
∂hL(p,wh,U)
∂wh
+
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂I
· L (p, wh, I) =
= ShLL +
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂I
· L (p, wh, I) .
(C.2)
If the first equation in (C.2) is multiplied by
pj
xhi
, the second by
pj
Lh
, the third
by w
h
xhi
, the fourth by w
h
Lh
and the last terms (income effects) by I
I
, then it is
28
possible to write:
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂pj
· pj
xhi
εhij
= Shij · pjxhi
ε˜hij
− pj ·xj(p,w
h,I)
I
shj
· ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂I
· I
xhi
ηhi
,
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂pj
· pj
Lh
εhLj
= ShLj · pjLh
ε˜hLj
− pj ·xj(p,w
h,I)
I
shj
· ∂L(p,w
h,I)
∂I
· I
Lh
ηhL
;
∂xi(p,wh,I)
∂wh
· wh
xhi
εhiL
= ShiL · w
h
xhi
ε˜hiL
− w
h·L(p,wh,I)
I
shL
· ∂xi(p,w
h,I)
∂I
· I
xhi
ηhi
,
∂L(p,wh,I)
∂wh
· wh
Lh
εhLL
= ShLL · w
h
Lh
ε˜hLL
− w
h·L(p,wh,I)
I
shL
· ∂L(p,w
h,I)
∂I
· I
Lh
ηhL
.
(C.3)
If the good i = 1 is a necessity then the income elasticity is between 0
and 1, that is 0 ≤ ηh1 < 1 ⇒ 0 ≤ ∂x
h
1
∂I
· I
xh1
< 1 ⇒ ∂xh1
∂I
<
xh1
I
, and if the
good i = 2 is a luxury then the income elasticity is greater than 1, that is
ηh2 ≥ 1⇒ ∂x
h
2
∂I
· I
xh2
≥ 1⇒ ∂xh2
∂I
≥ xh2
I
.
D. KR-SG Utility Function: Elasticities, (Gross) Marginal Social
Evaluations and Adverse Selection Terms
With public information (section 3) and considering a log transformation of
the KR-SG utility function, the elasticities εh1j, with j = 1, 2, L, in (10) are:
εh11 = −α · w
h·(T−b`)−p2·b2
(p1)2
· p1
xh1
,
εh12 = −α · b2p1 ·
p2
xh1
,
εh1L = α · T−b`p1 · w
h
xh1
(D.1)
with εh11 < 0, ε
h
12 > 0 and ε
h
1L > 0; the elasticities ε
h
2j are:
εh21 = −β · b1p2 ·
p1
xh2
,
εh22 = −β · w
h·(T−b`)−p1·b1
(p2)2
· p2
xh2
,
εh2L = β · T−b`p2 · w
h
xh2
(D.2)
with εh21 < 0, ε
h
22 < 0 and ε
h
2L > 0; the elasticities ε
h
Lj are:
εhL1 = γ · b1wh · p1Lh ,
εhL2 = γ · b2wh · p2Lh ,
εhLL = −γ ·
∑
i=1,2
pi·bi
(wh)2
· wh
Lh
(D.3)
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with εhL1 > 0 and ε
h
L2 < 0.
If the Government redistribute resources among individuals (subsection
3.1), in case of a log transformation of the KR-SG utility function the elas-
ticities εh1j, with j = 1, 2, L, in (25) and considered in the FOCs (27) are:
εh11 = −α · m
h·(T−b`)−q2·b2
(q1)2
· q1
xh1
,
εh12 = −α · b2q1 ·
q2
xh1
,
εh1L = α · T−b`q1 · m
h
xh1
;
(D.4)
the elasticities εh2j are:
εh21 = −β · b1−xGq2 ·
q1
xh2
,
εh22 = −β · m
h·(T−b`)+q1·xG−q1·b1
(q2)2
· q2
xh2
,
εh2L = β · T−b`q2 · m
h
xh2
;
(D.5)
and the elasticities εhLj are:
εhL1 = γ · b1−xGmh · q1Lh ,
εhL2 = γ · b2mh · q2Lh ,
εhLL = −γ ·
∑
i=1,2
qi·bi−q1·xG
(mh)2
· mh
Lh
.
(D.6)
Moreover, the (gross) marginal social evaluations of h’s utility of good i =
1, 2, labour L and the publicly provided good G considered in the FOCs (27)
are:
βhi = −βh · 1mh·(T−b`)+q1·xG− ∑
i=1,2
qi·bi · xhi ,
βhL = β
h · 1
mh·(T−b`)+q1·xG−
∑
i=1,2
qi·bi · Lh,
βhG = β
h · 1
mh·(T−b`)+q1·xG−
∑
i=1,2
qi·bi · q1.
(D.7)
With moral hazard (section 4), in case of a log transformation of the KR-
SG utility function the elasticities ε˜h1j, with j = 1, 2, L, in (25) and considered
in the FOCs (27) are:
ε˜h11 = S˜
h
11 · q˜1x˜h1 = −α ·
x˜h1
p1·
(
α· q˜1
p1
+β· q˜2
p2
+γ· m˜h
wh
) · q˜1
x˜h1
,
ε˜h12 = S˜
h
12 · q˜2x˜h1 = −α ·
x˜h2
p2·
(
α· q˜1
p1
+β· q˜2
p2
+γ· m˜h
wh
) · q˜2
x˜h1
,
ε˜h1L = I˜
h
1L · m˜
h
x˜h1
= α · L˜h
wh·
(
α· q˜1
p1
+β· q˜2
p2
+γ· m˜h
wh
) · m˜h
xh1
;
(D.8)
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the elasticities ε˜h2j are:
ε˜h21 = S˜
h
21 · q˜1x˜h2 = −β ·
x˜h1
p1·
(
α· q˜1
p1
+β· q˜2
p2
+γ· m˜h
wh
) · q˜1
x˜h2
,
ε˜h22 = S˜
h
22 · q˜2x˜h2 = −β ·
x˜h2
p2·
(
α· q˜1
p1
+β· q˜2
p2
+γ· m˜h
wh
) · q˜2
x˜h2
,
ε˜h2L = I˜
h
2L · m˜
h
x˜h2
= β · L˜h
wh·
(
α· q˜1
p1
+β· q˜2
p2
+γ· m˜h
wh
) · m˜h
x˜h2
;
(D.9)
and the elasticities ε˜hLj are:
ε˜hL1 = S˜
h
L1 · q˜1L˜h = γ ·
x˜h1
p1·
(
α· q˜1
p1
+β· q˜2
p2
+γ· m˜h
wh
) · q˜1
L˜h
,
ε˜hL2 = S˜
h
L2 · q˜2L˜h = γ ·
x˜h2
p2·
(
α· q˜1
p1
+β· q˜2
p2
+γ· m˜h
wh
) · q˜2
L˜h
,
ε˜hLL = I˜
h
LL · m˜
h
L˜h
= −γ · L˜h
wh·
(
α· q˜1
p1
+β· q˜2
p2
+γ· m˜h
wh
) · m˜h
L˜h
.
(D.10)
With moral hazard and adverse selection (section 5), in case of a log
transformation of the KR-SG utility function the terms σ1, σ2, σ
A, σˆA and
σG in the FOCs (40) are:
σ1 = − 1
ϕˇA·
(
α· qˇ1
p1
+β· qˇ2
p2
+γ· mˇA
wA
) · xˇA1 + 1ϕˆA·(α· qˇ1
p1
+β· qˇ2
p2
+γ· mˇB
wB
) · xˇB1 ,
σ2 = − 1
ϕˇA·
(
α· qˇ1
p1
+β· qˇ2
p2
+γ· mˇA
wA
) · xˇA2 + 1ϕˆA·(α· qˇ1
p1
+β· qˇ2
p2
+γ· mˇB
wB
) · xˇB2 ,
σA = βˇAL =
1
ϕˇA·
(
α· qˇ1
p1
+β· qˇ2
p2
+γ· mˇA
wA
) · LˇA,
σˆA = − 1
ϕˆA·
(
α· qˇ1
p1
+β· qˇ2
p2
+γ· mˇB
wB
) · LˇB,
σG =
(
1
ϕˇA·
(
α· qˇ1
p1
+β· qˇ2
p2
+γ· mˇA
wA
) − 1
ϕˆA·
(
α· qˇ1
p1
+β· qˇ2
p2
+γ· mˇB
wB
)
)
· qˇ1.
(D.11)
E. Tax Evasion Fines
In what follows it is assumed the Government may audit both the individuals
taking hidden actions (tax evasion by moral hazard) and the individuals
having hidden information (tax evasion by adverse selection). Therefore, the
Government intervenes to punish tax evasion both by moral hazard and by
adverse selection.
The expected indirect utility of individuals taking hidden actions is:
E
(
V˜h
)
= (1− pi) · V˜ (t, τh, xG; p, wh)+ pi · V˜ (t, τh, xG, F˜ h; p, wh) (E.1)
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with F˜ h the tax evasion by moral hazard fines.
If type A individuals do not take hidden actions, but have hidden infor-
mation, their expected indirect utility is:
E
(
VˆA
)
= (1− pi) · Vˆ (t, τB, xG; p,w)+ pi · Vˆ (t, τB, xG, FˆA; p,w) (E.2)
with FˆA being the fine for tax evasion by adverse selection.
The Government decides not only the optimal redistribution system, but
also the amount of fines F˜ h and FˆA. Therefore, the GP is:
W˘ = max
t˘,τ˘ ,x˘G,F˜,FˆA
W
(
piA · V˘A, piB · V˘B
)
s.t.
∑
h=A,B
pih ·
(
τ˘h · L˘h + ∑
i=1,2
t˘i · x˘hi
)
− p1 · x˘G ≥ 0
(
λ˘G
)
V˘h ≥ E
(
V˜h
) (
λhMH
)
V˘A ≥ E
(
VˆA
)
(λAS) ,
(E.3)
where V˘h = V(t˘, τ˘h, x˘G; p, wh) and with x˘hi = xi(t˘, τ˘h, x˘G; p, wh) and L˘h =
L(t˘, τ˘h, x˘G; p, w
h). Since
−λhMH ·
∂E(V˜h)
∂F˜h
= 0 → λhMH = 0,
−λAS · ∂E(Vˆ
A)
∂FˆA
= 0 → λAS = 0
(E.4)
the problem entails the FOCs (27), where the elasticities are the ones in
(D.4), (D.5) and (D.6) and where the (gross) marginal social evaluations
of the h’s utility are the ones in (D.7); therefore F˜ h are determined from
V˘h = E
(
V˜h
)
and FˆA is determined from V˘A = E
(
VˆA
)
.
Considering a log transformation of the KR-SG utility function, the de-
mand system for the goods i = 1, 2 and leisure ` of individuals taking hidden
actions and not audited is:
x˜h1 + xG = b1 + α ·
ψ˜(t,τh,xG;p,wh)
p1
,
x˜h2 = b2 + β ·
ψ˜(t,τh,xG;p,wh)
p2
,
T − L˜h = b` + γ · ψ˜(t,τ
h,xG;p,w
h)
wh
(E.5)
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with ψ˜
(
t, τh, xG; p, w
h
)
=
(
mh · (T − b`) + q1 · xG −
∑
i=1,2
qi · bi
)
·(
α · p1
q1
+ β · p2
q2
+ γ · wh
mh
)
, while when audited it is:
x˜h1 + xG = b1 + α ·
ψ˜(t,τh,xG,F˜h;p,wh)
p1
,
x˜h2 = b2 + β ·
ψ˜(t,τh,xG,F˜h;p,wh)
p2
,
T − L˜h = b` + γ · ψ˜(t,τ
h,xG,F˜
h;p,wh)
wh
(E.6)
with ψ˜
(
t, τh, xG, F˜
h; p, wh
)
= ψ˜
(
t, τh, xG; p, w
h
)− F˜ h.
If type A individuals do not take hidden actions, but have hidden infor-
mation, their demand system for the goods i = 1, 2 and leisure ` when not
audited is:
xˆA1 + xG = b1 + α ·
ψˆ(t,τB ,xG;p,w)
p1
,
xˆA2 = b2 + β ·
ψˆ(t,τB ,xG;p,w)
p2
,
T − LˆA = b` + γ · ψˆ(t,τ
B ,xG;p,w)
wA
(E.7)
with ψˆ
(
t, τB, xG; p,w
)
=
(
wA − wB) · (T − b`) +
+
(
mB · (T − b`) + q1 · xG −
∑
i=1,2
qi · bi
)
·
(
α · p1
q1
+ β · p2
q2
+ γ · wB
mB
)
, while when
audited it is:
xˆA1 + xG = b1 + α ·
ψˆ(t,τB ,xG,FˆA;p,w)
p1
,
xˆA2 = b2 + β ·
ψˆ(t,τB ,xG,FˆA;p,w)
p2
,
T − LˆA = b` + γ · ψˆ(t,τ
B ,xG,Fˆ
A;p,w)
wA
(E.8)
with ψˆ
(
t, τB, xG, Fˆ
A; p,w
)
= ψˆ
(
t, τB, xG; p,w
)− FˆA.
Considering an audit probability pi = 0.5 allows to obtain in the Util-
itarian case the results displayed in tables 2 and 3 with F˜A = 0.1459,
F˜B = 0.1645 and FˆA = 15.0613 and in the Rawlsian case the results dis-
played in tables 4 and 5 with F˜A = 0.1492, F˜B = 0.1689 and FˆA = 15.2370.
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